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Abstract  Improving our ability to cope with large risks is one 
of the key challenges for humankind in this century. This article 
outlines a research program in this perspective. Starting with 
a concrete example of a relatively small disaster, it questions 
simplistic ideas of rationality. It then proposes a fresh look at 
the concepts of probability and utility in the context of socio- 
ecological systems. This leads first to an emphasis on the 
problem of equilibrium selection, and then to a distinction 
between three kinds of resilience that matter both for theory 
and practice of risk management. They can be investigated 
by paying attention to the transitions into and out of actual 
disasters. 
Keywords integrated risk governance, rationality, resilience, 
risk 
1 Introduction 
The twenty-first century is likely to see widespread economic 
growth along with great successes in overcoming poverty all 
around the world. At the same time, the century will be marked 
by growing risks in many areas, including natural, techno- 
logical, and institutional disasters. Improving our ability to 
cope with such risks is one of the key challenges for human- 
kind in this century. We cannot afford to make many mistakes 
with large-scale disasters; therefore it is essential to learn 
from relatively small cases as much as possible in view of the 
large, sometimes global risks we are faced with. 
The starting point of this article is a concrete example that 
highlights strengths and weaknesses of current practices in 
dealing with risks. It shows how important it is to move 
beyond an idea of rationality as essentially applying general 
principles to particular situations. Whatever general state- 
ments can be made need to be embedded in a sense of 
practical judgement that is renewed with each new risk to 
be mastered. This, however, is not enough. There is a need 
to investigate the role of probabilities and preferences in 
the context of socio-ecological systems. This leads to the 
problem of equilibrium selection as a major focus for 
research. By looking at the entry- and exit-transitions of 
emergencies, it is possible to gain new insights about three 
kinds of resilience that characterize socio-ecological systems 
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in the face of risks. Along these lines, I suggest elements of a 
research program that can enable scholars and practitioners to 
jointly improve existing practices in view of the risks we will 
need to tackle in our common future. 
2 A Tragic Event 
In summer 1989, some 150 people met in Berlin for a little 
gathering: an electronic dance music festival and parade. The 
organizers announced the event as a political manifestation 
and called it "Love Parade". In the following years the event 
was repeated, attracting more and more people. After ten 
years, the Love Parade was an annual mega-event with about 
a million participants. In 2007, the event moved from Berlin 
to the Ruhr area, the former industrial core of Germany. 
Meanwhile, the series had become the greatest set of dance 
events worldwide. It was a remarkably peaceful affair, a huge 
advertisement opportunity mobilizing major commercial 
interests, a gathering of millions of young people enjoying 
themselves in the name of love. 
In the run-up to the 2010 Love Parade, to be held in the city 
of Duisburg in July 2010, massive concern was expressed on 
internet chats by people who wanted to attend. They criticized 
the fact that the whole event was to take place in an enclosed 
area, and that the only way in and out would be through 
a tunnel-large perhaps, but with concrete walls and no 
alternative pathway in case problems should arise. "I can't 
believe it! I see people dying," wrote one blogger. The police 
and the fire department voiced similar doubts and suggested 
a different setting to avoid critical risks. 
A safety concept developed with the participation of world- 
class risk researchers at Duisburg University dispelled these 
doubts, and the original arrangement was preserved. On a 
sunny Saturday afternoon, a crowd of hundreds of thousands 
of people began to move through the tunnel towards the 
single entrance with the intent of enjoying hours of music and 
dance. 
Three hours later more than 300 participants had been 
injured, 19 were dead (The Economist 2010). They came 
from Germany, but also from Australia, Bosnia, China, Italy, 
and other countries. In a situation of huge stress, some had 
tried to bypass the bottleneck between the tunnel and the 
entrance of the enclosed area by using stairs that run along a 
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concrete wall. The stairs were blocked by a little fence, but it 
was easily overcome. A sense of hope led thousands of people 
to move towards the wall. For those already close to the wall, 
the physical pressure of the masses ofpeople was huge, creat- 
ing injuries and killing people by suffocation. Exhaustion 
and panic set in amongst many of the tens of thousands of 
people in and around the tunnel, while the news of the tragedy 
slowly spread amongst the hundreds of thousands who were 
already listening to the music. 
3 Reflective Practitioners 
The Duisburg tragedy confronts us with some of the key chal- 
lenges of contemporary risk management, it happened at a 
public event in a rich country with a highly developed safety 
culture and sophisticated technological infrastructure, and it 
happened despite a safety concept developed with the help of 
the most advanced scientific knowledge on pedestrian flows 
and mass panic. Learning from such experiences is vital if we 
are to deal responsibly with the large-scale risks of the future 
(Jaeger et al. 2001). 
Many important aspects of this particular accident are 
well-known from other disasters. They range from the finan- 
cial pressure on the organizers to the mindless haste in which 
key preparations took place, it is necessary, however, to look 
at some underlying issues that relate to the idea of rationality 
and require fundamentally new research to be addressed. 
The study of pedestrian flows, including the dynamics of 
mass panic, is one of the most interesting examples of how 
mathematical methods known from physics can be applied to 
human behavior with the help of computer simulations 
(Helbing et al. 2005; Schreckenberg and Selten 2004). These 
methods were used in the Duisburg case, and the experts 
involved did think about possible disasters ranging from 
panic triggered by misinformation to the possibility of a bomb 
being placed in the ominous tunnel. But the kind of accident 
that actually happened was not recognized as a possibility. 
After the event, a leading expert was quoted as saying: "The 
accident happened because some participants didn't follow 
the rules," by which he meant that they climbed structures-- 
containers and a pylon--they were not supposed to nor 
allowed to climb. He claimed that the accident had happened 
because they fell down from those structures, a claim soon 
disproved by witness accounts and video recordings. The 
same expert had not visited the site before giving his advice 
to the organizers--he was confident that his know-how and 
toolkit were sufficient to tackle the questions he was being 
asked. 
Simulation models of pedestrian flows are a special 
instance of multiagent models, and their track record in 
reproducing empirical data is among the best in the field of 
social science modelling. Moreover, it is evident that the 
management of pedestrian flows involving hundreds of 
thousands of people has much to gain from computer models 
that can help to assess the density, direction, and speed of 
these flows, both at the aggregate level and at the scale of 
single doors, stairs, and so on. But using such tools well 
requires more than technical expertise in the domain of 
mathematical models and their implementation on comput- 
ers. it requires the kind of know-how that Sch6n (1983) 
described in his widely acclaimed, but still too widely 
neglected, work on reflective practitioners. 
This is a know-how that treats the theoretical principles 
and analytical techniques so prominent in Western science as 
useful and indispensable, but also as meaningless without a 
context of practical problem solving that cannot be reduced 
to those principles and techniques. By this token, it is a 
know-how that transcends the idea of absolute rationality that 
Perrow (1984) identified as a root cause of increasing risks 
in our global society. The insights of contemporary science 
are not the bedrock of knowledge; they are sediments of 
professional practice. Each time they are used to solve a new 
problem, they need to be embedded in fresh conversations 
among reflective practitioners and people familiar with the 
specific problem. 
Story-telling is a fundamental resource to be used in this 
spirit (Wilkinson 2009). Narratives provide the opportunity to 
blend generalized insights with unique events, and they can 
give a much richer sense of the possibilities generated by 
a concrete situation than the computer models currently 
available, in many situations such models are tremendously 
useful, often indispensable. However, applying simulation 
models to risky situations with which one does not have a 
familiarity that is much richer than those models, is a danger- 
ous exercise--the pedestrian flows leading to the Duisburg 
tragedy are one example, the financial flows that led to the 
global financial crisis of 2008 another (Colander et al. 2009). 
How can we develop models and user interfaces that help 
professionals dealing with risks to become reflective practi- 
tioners, and never to forget this lesson, even in the face of 
the best conceivable models? This is the initial question for a 
research program to deal with the risks of the twenty-first 
century. 
4 Probability and Utility 
The modern approach to risk management began with insur- 
ance contracts for italian ships in the fourteenth century. 
The insurance business gradually developed and was greatly 
expanded in the wake of the Great Fire of London of 1666. 
Since then, the practice of risk management, and especially of 
insurance, has been reflectively improved again and again 
with the help of mathematical probability theory. 
Probability theory emerged out of reflections about the 
practice of gambling. They were triggered by the Chevalier 
de M6r6, a French nobleman, in 1654, and were developed in 
an exchange of letters between famous French mathemati- 
cians Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat (Devlin 2008). Their 
basic problem remains relevant today and can be framed as 
follows. Suppose you celebrate your birthday in a gambling 
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salon and somebody offers you a choice between three gam- 
bles as a gift. In the first game, a coin is tossed three times, 
and if this yields heads three times, you get 100 Euros, other- 
wise nothing. In game two, a pair of dice is thrown two times, 
and if in at least one throw the sum of the two dice is 7, you 
get 100 Euros as well. And in the third game you are blind- 
folded and supposed to pick two balls out of an urn with 10 
balls, 9 black and 1 red; if by chance you pick two balls of 
different colors, you again get 100 Euros. If you want to have 
the biggest chance of getting the 100 Euro prize, which game 
should you choose? 
The problem can be described as follows: you have three 
possible actions; for each action, you are interested in a 
particular possibility, namely that you win the prize; and 
you want to maximize your chances to win that prize. The 
problem then can be written as: 
Max E-] 100 Euro * prob ( winning lx ) 
s.t: x e  [1,2,3]  
Eq. 1 
The expression "Max [x 1" indicates that the variable x shall be 
chosen so as to maximize the term following it. The expres- 
sion "winning] x" indicates the situation where you win 
having chosen game x; "prob" is a function that indicates 
the probability of each possible outcome of each game. The 
challenge is to define that function. 
In the first game, there are eight possible patterns of 
heads and tails. Writing 1 for heads and 0 for tails, they can 
be written as the binary numbers from zero to seven: 000, 
001, . . . ,  111. As these are all the possible patterns of heads 
or tails, the possibility that at least one of them will occur (that 
is, one of the set of all eight patterns) is assigned a probabil- 
ity of 1. If moreover one assumes that these patterns have the 
same probability--a key assumption that is far from trivial--  
then each one must have a probability of 1/8. This is the 
probability of winning. By the same kind of reasoning, the 
probability of winning in game two can be computed as 1/6 
and in game three as 1/5. Now the "prob" function is defined 
for all three cases; clearly, the third game is the best and the 
solution to problem 1 is x -  3. 
Since the days of Fermat and Pascal, probability theory 
has been greatly refined, as has the practice of risk manage- 
ment. A major step at the interface of these two developments 
occurred in 1738, when the Swiss mathematician Daniel 
Bernoulli published (in the journal of the St. Petersburg 
Academy of Sciences) his solution to a problem posed 
25 years earlier by his cousin Nicholas Bernoulli. The 
problem, known as the St. Petersburg paradox, was how to 
evaluate a game where a coin is tossed until it yields tails, and 
where the prize is 2n ducats, with n the number of tosses so 
far. The idea captured in problem 1, where money is multi- 
plied with probability, leads into difficulties here. The value 
of the prize increases more rapidly than the probability of the 
prize decreases, and this happens over an unlimited number 
of steps. As a result, the game seems to have an infinite value, 
but nobody would be willing to pay a large amount of money 
to be allowed to play it. Daniel Bernoulli addressed this 
difficulty by generalizing problems like in Eq. 1 into 
problems of the form: 
Max Ex] ZEc] u ( e ) * p r o b ( e  Ix )  Eq. 2 
s.t: x e X, 
c e C  
Here, C is the set of possible consequences of actions, X the 
set of possible actions, and u is a utility function representing 
the preferences over those consequences. Daniel Bernoulli 
argued that the utility function has to be strictly concave, dis- 
playing diminishing marginal utility and implying risk averse 
behavior. He saw that his framework was not only relevant to 
deal with the abstract possibility of infinite gains, but also in 
view of the very real possibility of large finite losses, includ- 
ing the risk of bankruptcy. As he wrote to Nicholas: "If only 
the Bernoullis, who lost so much when the Mfillers went 
bankrupt, had paid attention to the very principles that I have 
established, they would probably not have lost as much" (see 
Jallais, Pradier, and Teira 2008, 49). 
Daniel Bernoulli's idea of diminishing marginal utility 
became a cornerstone of economic theory as we know it, and 
his combination of probability and utility has deeply shaped 
the tradition of risk management. However, while probability 
theory made tremendous progress in the times following 
his breakthrough, the combination of probability and utility 
lay dormant until 1947. In that year, as an appendix to the 
second edition of their seminal work on game theory, 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) published the first 
axiomatic structure combining probability and utility. 
With that step, professional risk management had come of 
age. Dealing with risks by assessing--even if provisionally-- 
the probability of different events as well as their relevance 
for the goals a decision-maker is pursuing became common 
practice. Rough and ready methods were used in this spirit, 
as well as highly sophisticated models, including those of 
pedestrian flows, in the risk assessment for the Duisburg love 
parade. 
5 The Problem of Equilibrium Selection 
There is a fundamental problem with this approach, however, 
a problem that led to the development of game theory by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern in the first place. In most practical 
situations the environment of a human agent includes other 
human agents--be they physical persons or various kinds of 
collective actors. Therefore, no agent can assess his or her 
own risks without assessing how the other agents assess 
theirs, and those other agents cannot do that without assessing 
how the first agent assesses his or her own risks. Clearly, there 
is a kind of circularity here. If agents frame their situations 
according to problem 2, they neglect the interdependencies 
between them. Therefore, rational as the approach may seem, 
it is bound to lead to major failures whenever these interde- 
pendencies matter. Major examples of this kind of failure are 
financial crises, as these usually are promoted by behavior 
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that is quite advantageous for an agent as long as those inter- 
dependencies can be neglected, but becomes self-destructive 
otherwise. 
von Neumann and Morgenstern addressed this problem 
by looking for situations where each agent knows the risk 
assessments by all agents, and where the resulting actions are 
optimal for each agent in the given situation. This pattern was 
analyzed in general terms by Nash (1950) and is now known 
as a Nash equilibrium. It has turned out to be tremendously 
useful in a large variety of situations, for example, the 
so-called prisoners' dilemma elaborated by Flood, Dresher, 
and Tucker in 1950 (see Flood 1952 and the discussion 
in Poundstone 1992). Basic aspects of mass panics can be 
analysed with the model of the prisoner's dilemma, too. 
However, only very simple games have obvious Nash 
equilibria, and even then there may be many of them. Systems 
of interdependent agents with shared environments--socio- 
ecological systems (Young et al. 2006)--are characterized by 
dynamics that are much more complex than simple conver- 
gence towards an equilibrium state or persistence in such a 
state. Therefore, the question of how systems of interdepen- 
dent agents evolve, whether they find equilibrium positions, 
and if so, how, becomes crucial for research on risks. This 
is especially important in view of global risks, as here the 
interdependence between agents plays a central role. Two 
important answers to this problem deserve our attention here. 
They center on the phenomena of conventions and of social 
norms. 
A paradigmatic example of a convention is given by pat- 
terns of right-hand-side or left-hand-side driving. Research 
on the evolution of conventions has shown how conventions 
can emerge out of stochastic processes in socio-ecological 
systems, how such systems can persist in Nash equilibria 
established by convention, and how random events can lead 
to switches between such equilibria (Young 1993). The rele- 
vance of conventions for risk management is well illustrated 
by their role in financial markets (Wyart and Bouchaud 
2003). 
Once a convention is established, it tends to persist simply 
because it establishes a Nash equilibrium: in general, it is in 
the best interest of agents to follow the convention, as the 
example of right-hand-driving illustrates. However, consider 
the problem of precedence at intersections. The convention 
that the driver coming from the right (or the one from the left) 
has precedence only works if there is little traffic. Without 
conventions, the situation becomes what is known as a 
chicken game: if one driver dares to move while the others 
wait, the first one has an advantage; if all wait, they are all 
in trouble; and if all dare to move simultaneously, the trouble 
is greater still. A widely used solution to this coordination 
problem is the installation of traffic lights. They allow for a 
different kind of equilibria, so-called correlated equilibria 
(Aumann 1974). They have two important advantages over 
Nash equilibria: they are much easier to find, and they often 
allow for outcomes that are better than those from Nash 
equilibria. The latter point is well illustrated by the difference 
between a traffic light and a chicken game at intersections. 
Gintis (2009) calls the correlating device a choreographer and 
argues that this is a key role of social norms. In this perspec- 
tive, norms develop through similar processes as conventions. 
However, they work in much more sophisticated ways, 
including the influence of moral arguments and sanctions. 
For conventions and norms to work, each agent must know 
that the other agents orient their actions according to those 
conventions and sanctions. This is especially relevant in situ- 
ations of crisis, where the validity of specific conventions and 
norms is in doubt. As far as an individual agent is concerned, 
a key tool for reflecting on his or her possibilities to navigate 
the risks that come with such situations is an algorithm 
updating probabilities based on Bayes's theorem. 
That theorem was discovered around 1755 by Thomas 
Bayes (Swinburne 2002). It establishes a simple relation 
between two conditional probabilities. Consider probabilities 
over a set of events C (where not only the elements of C, but 
also its subsets as well as C itself are considered as events). 
Let A and B be two subsets of a set C and define conditional 
probabilities as follows: 
prob ( A IB ) = prob ( A ~ B) / prob ( B ) Eq. 3 
Then it immediately follows that: 
prob (AIB)  = prob (B I A) * 
[ p r o b ( A )  / p r o b ( B ) ]  Eq. 4 
This is such a simple result that one may wonder why it 
has become one of the most influential concepts in statistics, 
decision theory, programs for machine learning, and more. 
And in fact it is not the theorem as such, but its relation to 
much more complex situations that makes it so important. 
Consider, for example, a system that can assume several 
states, say Achilles who can be angry or satisfied, together 
with observable behaviors of that system, say Achilles 
shouting or smiling (the following analysis owes much to 
Feyerabend 1992). Achilles can shout and smile in both 
moods, but the probability of doing so changes with his mood. 
Moreover, his state can be a mixture of anger and satisfaction, 
again affecting his probability of shouting or smiling. 
Imagine you are Ulysses, who has the task to go into 
Achilles's tent and negotiate with him on behalf of the king. 
You have an idea about how angry he is, and you start talking 
with him, noticing his rare smiling as well as his frequent 
shouting. And as he starts shouting less and smiling more, you 
realize that his anger is fading away and that your chances of 
reaching an agreement are on the rise. 
Let ot be the observation made at time t and sj the j-th 
possible state (with "S" the set of possible states). Writing "p" 
for probability one can then formulate the following equation 
for Bayesian updating of probabilities: 
p ( s j  lot)  = p ( s j  I ot_l) * [ p ( o t  ISj) / 
~[S ] P ( Ot I SJ ) * P (sj I ot_l ) ] Eq. 5 
It is clearly analogous to Eq. 4, but now it describes a 
dynamical process in which the probability assigned to state 
sj evolves depending on observations Or. 
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This looks quite promising as a description of how Ulysses 
might perceive Achilles in the course of their conversation, 
but can the formula be proved? Of course not, unless much 
more assumptions are given. On the other hand, for systems 
that can be described with this kind of dynamics, more might 
be provable. For example, different observers who start with 
different assessments of the probabilities for the initial 
states--the so-called priors--may or may not converge on 
similar assessments of the actual states by sharing a sequence 
of observations (Hawthorne 1994). This is important, as the 
relevant systems might include not only Achilles but also 
other human beings, or quantum systems with their states 
and observables, or the earth crust in California with its inner 
tensions and intermittent earthquakes. 
What happens if interdependent agents try to coordinate 
themselves by updating their probabilities according to an 
algorithm like Eq. 4? This depends on all sorts of specific 
conditions. But as Gintis (2009) has shown, they have a fair 
chance of stabilizing norms and conventions if they start from 
common priors, while they will find themselves in serious 
trouble without common priors. Therefore, solving coordina- 
tion problems in socio-ecological systems requires processes 
by which common priors are established and maintained as 
part of common sense--not once and for all, but whenever a 
new coordination problem arises. 
In the Duisburg case, common priors were taken for 
granted by the organisers, and for a while this assumption 
turned out to be reasonable. However, the assumption was 
misleading in the face of people who lost their trust that they 
would happily reach the concert area by following the instruc- 
tions of the organisers. Not having foreseen this possibility 
remains the responsibility of the modellers. In a similar way, 
the possibility of trust breaking down on financial markets 
had not been foreseen by economic modellers before the 
global financial crisis of 2008. 
6 Three Kinds of Resilience 
Looking at risks in the context of socio-ecological systems 
offers a way out of the definitional maze that has grown 
around the concept of risk. Probability, utility, and game- 
theoretic equilibria--be they Nash or correlated--will all 
have their role to play, but the starting point is the difference 
between normal states of affairs and emergencies. This differ- 
ence need not be introduced by an external observer. Rather, 
socio-ecological systems have grammars that enable the 
people involved in them to make that distinction. For 
somebody driving a car on the road, an accident usually is an 
emergency; for a car insurer, it is an event in the normal course 
of affairs. A child cutting a sibling with a knife at dinner is 
likely to trigger an emergency; a surgeon cutting the skin of a 
patient is performing a normal operation. If a global nuclear 
war should start, it would be an emergency for humankind as 
a whole. 
Many emergencies are challenges that can be met without 
disrupting the system in question. These are familiar risks that 
can be represented in the probability-utility framework: 
events one prefers to avoid but also knows how to handle. 
in many cultures, floods, droughts, even earthquakes belong 
to this category--those cultures have learned to deal with 
these emergencies as one can learn to deal with various 
accidents, illnesses, and death. This may be called first-order 
resilience. 
An important way in which socio-ecological systems 
develop first-order resilience is by developing subsystems 
that have the capability to treat as normal business what for 
the rest of the system is an emergency. The insurance industry 
is a major example of such a subsystem, but so are hospitals, 
armies, fire brigades, and many others. Governments assume 
this role in various circumstances, for example, when they 
bail out banks they consider too big to fail. in the face of 
global risks that exceed current coping capacities, developing 
new institutions that maintain first-order resilience in the face 
of the corresponding emergencies is a major task (see Shiller 
2003, for a discussion of global financial risks). 
By distinguishing between normal states of affairs and 
emergencies, the grammars of socio-ecological systems 
define entry transitions into and exit transitions out of 
emergencies. When first-order resilience is established via a 
specialized subsystem, then the entry transition moves this 
subsystem into action, while with the exit transition it goes 
into standby mode again, improving the speed of those transi- 
tions often is an important way of improving first-order 
resilience. More generally speaking, studying the entry and 
exit transitions into emergencies is a key task, if we are to 
enhance our capability to deal with future risks (Integrated 
Risk Governance Project 2010, building on Kasperson et al. 
1988). 
The safety concept for the Duisburg Love Parade took 
first-order resilience for granted, as did the pedestrian flow 
models used to design and assess that concept. The financial 
regulations in place before the 2008 financial crisis took first- 
order resilience for granted in the much larger domain of 
global financial markets--as did the models used to design 
and assess those regulations. 
Larger perturbations, however, can destroy the coordina- 
tion capacity of a given socio-ecological system, leading to a 
very different kind of situation. This is where the capacity to 
manage the unexpected (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001) becomes 
critical. First-order resilience is based on patterns of conven- 
tions and norms that keep solving coordination problems in 
the face of perturbations. But no such pattern can be main- 
tained in the face of arbitrary perturbations. If the conditions 
under which a socio-ecological system operates change-- 
perhaps as a result of the dynamics of the system itself 
existing patterns of coordination may break down. The 
capability to handle this breakdown until the system can 
switch back into its normal way of operation may be called 
second-order resilience. 
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If a socio-ecological system operates under stable and 
foreseeable conditions, first-order resilience is usually all 
that matters. If the conditions are more turbulent, however, 
second-order resilience becomes much more important. 
So-called high-reliability organizations are characterized by 
high second-order resilience, while they may actually have 
weaker first-order resilience then their average competitors. 
Because in the entry transition to an unfamiliar emergency 
key coordination mechanisms have broken down, the shared 
environment becomes particularly important for the different 
agents, both because it presents new challenges and because 
it may offer opportunities to improvise new coordination 
patterns. In the Duisburg accident, the absence of alternatives 
to the tunnel as well as the presence of obstacles that could be 
surmounted on the way forward beyond the tunnel played key 
roles. In environmental disasters like floods or earthquakes, 
the shape of terrain, buildings, and debris plays a similar role. 
More generally, the point of view of socio-ecological systems 
is essential to understand the dynamics of norms and conven- 
tions in the face of risk (Walker et al. 2006). The environment 
here is not to be understood as some pristine natural land- 
scape, but as the material conditions of human interaction, 
including the built environment and all sorts of technological 
devices (Zha 2006). 
With regard to the exit transition, a fundamental distinc- 
tion arises: it may lead back to the previous state of normality 
or to a new one. The latter case is especially interesting if the 
system in question has found ways to reduce its vulnerability 
to the kind of perturbation it went through. This may be called 
third-order resilience. While first-order resilience is mainly a 
matter of robust patterns of norms and conventions, second- 
order resilience depends critically on the ability to improvise; 
third-order resilience in turn depends on the capability of 
the socio-ecological system to find a creative answer to the 
disruption it has experienced. 
treats them as objects of an intervention they are supposed to 
accept and welcome, but not to shape. 
With this background, three elements of a research 
program on risk governance in socio-ecological systems can 
be identified: 
(1) In the face of future risks, how can we use story-telling, 
computer models, and other tools to support and foster a 
culture of reflective practitioners? 
(2) What features of entry-transitions into emergencies can 
be identified so as to enhance first-order resilience of 
socio-ecological systems? 
(3) What features of entry- and exit-transitions can be 
identified so as to enhance higher-order resilience? 
It is impossible and not necessary to know in advance with 
great detail where this research program will lead. But it 
is clear that the intertwined themes of risk, rationality, and 
resilience are so pervasive in today's global society that 
significant insights can be expected with regard to an unusu- 
ally wide array of problems. And it is also clear that in a cul- 
ture of reflective practitioners such a research program cannot 
evolve first in academia and then be transferred to a domain 
of "applications." What is required are patient inquiries 
structured by a continuous dialogue between researchers 
and practitioners, where advances in research alternate with 
improvements in practice. 
This dialogue will refer to risks and emergencies at differ- 
ent scales, ranging from a fire in a village to sea level rise 
around the globe, from a technical failure in a small business 
to a breakdown of global financial markets. The issue of 
sustainability looms large in the relevant inquiries, in particu- 
lar the tension between the need for economic growth and 
the need to avoid environmental disasters. The research 
program proposed in this article shall help to address these 
challenges. 
7 Conclusion 
Human beings trying to cope with the risk of emergencies as 
well as with their occurrence are always embedded into socio- 
ecological systems. In fact, the research program sketched 
here may be called one of risk governance in socio-ecological 
systems. 
In this phrase, the proposition "in", rather than "of", is 
consciously chosen. The latter can too easily foster an attitude 
where management is seen as controlling the behavior of 
automata hardly recognizable as human beings. In the case of 
the Duisburg Love Parade, this meant that the autonomy and 
creativity of the participants was treated only as a possible 
disturbance and cause of disaster, not as a resource that might 
have helped to cope with the challenge of coordinating 
several hundred thousand people. Similarly, in the case of 
an earthquake, there is a fundamental difference between an 
approach that fosters the capability of people in the disaster 
area to take action and solve problems and an approach that 
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